Anthony Eden
    A FIRM POLICY
    February 21，1938
    There are occasions when strong political convic-tions must override all other considerations.Ofsuch an occasion，only the individual himself canbe the judge.
    The objective of foreign policy in this countryis and must always be the maintenance of peace.If，however，peace is to be enduring，it must reston foundations of frank reciprocity and of mutualrespect.It follows that we must be ready to nego－tiate with all countries，whatever their forms ofgovernment，in order to promote international un-derstanding.But we must also be watchful that，inour conception of such negotiations and in themethod by which we seek to further them，we are，in fact，strengthening，not undermining，the foun-dations on which international confidence rests.
    The immediate issue is whether such officialconversations（between the British and Italian gov－ernments） should be opened in Rome now.In myconviction，the attitude of the Italian governmentto international problems in general，and thiscountry in particular，is not yet such as to justifythis course.The ground has been in no respectprepared.Propaganda against this country by theltalian government is rife throughout the world.Iam myself pledged to this House not to open con－versations with Italy until this hostile propagandaceases.Moreover，little progress in fact，thoughmuch in promise，has been made with the solutionof the Spanish problem.Let me make it plain thatI do not suggest and would not advocate that thegovernment should refuse conversations with the I－talian government，or indeed with any other gov-ernment which shows any disposition to conversa－tion with us for betterment of international under－standing.Yet we must see that the conditions inwhich these conversations take place are such as tomake for the likelihood，if not for the certainty，oftheir success.In my view，those conditions do notexist today.
    In January of last year，after difficult negotia－tions，we signed an Anglo-Italian agreement.Within a very few days-indeed，almost simultane－ously—a considerable consignment of Italians leftfor Spain.It may be said that this was not a breachof our understanding；but no one，I think，willcontend that it did not run counter to its spirit.The same agreement contained a specific clausedealing with the cessation of propaganda，yet pro－paganda was scarcely diminished for an instant.
    Then last summer the Prime Minister and Sig-nor Mussolini exchanged letters，and after that fora few days relations between our two countriestook a marked turn for the better.There ensuedthe incidents in the Mediterranean，with which theHouse is familiar.
    My submission is that we cannot run the riskof further repetition of these experiences.
    We must agree not only on the need for with－drawal（of the foreign fighters now in Spain），buton the conditions of withdrawal.We have had as-surances enough of that in the past.We must gofarther，and show the world not only promises butachievement.
    We cannot consider this problem except in re－lation to the international situation as a whole.Weare in the presence of progressive deterioration ofrespect for international obligations.It is quite im－possible to judge these things in a vacuum.This isthe moment for this country to stand firm，not toplunge into negotiations unprepared，with fore-knowledge that the obstacle to their success hasnot been resolved.
    Agreements that are worth while are nevermade on the basis of threats，nor，in the past，hasthis country been willing to negotiate in such con-ditions.
    It has never entered into my conception tosuggest that the Italian forces alone should bewithdrawn from Spain，but only that the Italiangovernment should agree to，and carry out withothers，a fair scheme for the proposed withdrawalof all forces from Spain.
    I am conscious why I stand here，and why mycolleagues take another view.If they are right，their chances for success will certainly be enhancedif their policy is pursued through another ForeignSecretary.
    I should not be frank with the House if I pre－tended it is an isolated issue between the PrimeMinister and myself.It is not.Within in the last fewweeks，upon one of the most important decisionsof foreign policy，which did not concern Italy atall，the difference was fundamental.Moreover，itrecently has become clear to me，and，I think tohim，that there is between us a real difference inthe outlook and method.
    Of late the conviction has steadily grown uponme that there has been too keen a desire on ourpart to make terms with others，rather than thatothers should make terms with us.This has neverbeen the attitude of this country in the past.Itshould not，in the interests of peace，be our atti－tude today.
    I do not believe we can make progress in Euro－pean appeasement—more particularly in the lightof the events of the last few days—if we allow theimpression to gain currency abroad that we yield toconstant pressure.
    I am certain in my own mind that progress de-ponds，above all，on the temper，of the nation，andthat temper must find expression in a firm spirit.That spirit，I am confident，is there.Not to givevoice to it is，I believe，fair neither to this countrynor to the world.
    堅(jiān)定的政策
    1938年2月21日
    有些時(shí)候強(qiáng)烈的政治信念必須高于其他一切考慮。在這種時(shí)候，只有個(gè)人自己能夠做出判斷。我國(guó)的外交政策的目標(biāo)是，而且必須始終是維護(hù)和平。然而，和平如要持久，就要建立在真誠(chéng)相待和相互尊重的基礎(chǔ)上。因此，為了增進(jìn)國(guó)際諒解，我們就必須隨時(shí)準(zhǔn)備與任何國(guó)家協(xié)商，而不管他們具有何種政體。但是我們也必須注意到，事實(shí)上我們正在按照我們對(duì)于這種協(xié)商的設(shè)想和我們用以探索促進(jìn)這種協(xié)商的方法，加強(qiáng)而不是削弱國(guó)際信任賴以立足的基礎(chǔ)。
    當(dāng)前急需解決的問題是：現(xiàn)在是否就應(yīng)該在羅馬開始（英國(guó)政府與意大利政府之間的）這種官方的會(huì)談。依我之見，意大利政府對(duì)國(guó)際問題的總的態(tài)度，尤其是對(duì)我國(guó)的態(tài)度，還不足以證明進(jìn)行會(huì)談的正確性。無論在哪一方面條件都未成熟。意大利政府在全世界大搞反英宣傳。本人向下院保證，在這種敵對(duì)宣傳停止之前不和意大利會(huì)談。此外，在解決西班牙問題方面，盡管有許多承諾，事實(shí)上幾乎沒有取得什么進(jìn)展。我要說明的是，我并不建議，也不會(huì)贊成政府拒絕和意大利政府，乃至有意與我們?yōu)楦纳茋?guó)際諒解而會(huì)談的任何其他政府會(huì)談。然而我們必須明白，舉行這些會(huì)談的條件應(yīng)該是有助于使會(huì)談的成功成為可能，即使不是必然。依我之見，那些條件現(xiàn)在還不具備。
    去年1月，經(jīng)過艱難的談判之后，我們簽署了英意協(xié)定。在短短幾天之內(nèi)——實(shí)際上幾乎是在同時(shí)——大批意大利人被運(yùn)送到西班牙。也許有人會(huì)說，這不是破壞我們的協(xié)議；但是我想沒有人會(huì)認(rèn)為這沒有違反協(xié)定的精神。就是這個(gè)協(xié)定包含了一項(xiàng)涉及停止宣傳的特定條款，然而宣傳幾乎沒有減少過片刻。
    接著在去年夏天，首相和墨索里尼先生交換了信件，我們兩國(guó)之間的關(guān)系在此后的短短幾天里曾經(jīng)有明顯的好轉(zhuǎn)。但隨之而來的是地中海地區(qū)所發(fā)生的事件。下院對(duì)這些事件是熟悉的。
    我認(rèn)為我們不能冒重蹈覆轍的危險(xiǎn)。
    我們不僅必須在（目前西班牙境內(nèi)的外國(guó)戰(zhàn)斗人員）撤離的必要性上，而且還必須在撤離的條件上達(dá)成一致意見。過去我們對(duì)此有過足夠的信心。我們必須繼續(xù)努力，不僅向世界展示希望，而且還要展示成功。
    我們?cè)谒伎歼@個(gè)問題時(shí)不能把它與整個(gè)國(guó)際局勢(shì)的聯(lián)系排除在外。我們正面臨對(duì)國(guó)際義務(wù)的日益不尊重。對(duì)這些問題根本不可能在真空中作出評(píng)判。預(yù)見到談判成功的障礙仍未消除，我國(guó)現(xiàn)在就該站穩(wěn)立場(chǎng)，而不貿(mào)然進(jìn)行毫無準(zhǔn)備的談判。
    有價(jià)值的協(xié)議從來不是在威脅的基礎(chǔ)上達(dá)成的。我們這個(gè)國(guó)家過去從來不愿在這種情況下進(jìn)行談判。
    我從來沒有想到過要意大利軍隊(duì)單獨(dú)撤離西班牙，而只是想表示：意大利政府應(yīng)該同意并且與其他國(guó)家一起執(zhí)行一項(xiàng)建議所有軍隊(duì)撤離西班牙的公平的計(jì)劃。
    我意識(shí)到我為什么堅(jiān)持這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)，也意識(shí)到我的同僚們?yōu)槭裁闯至硪环N觀點(diǎn)。如果我的同僚們是正確的，而他們的政策通過另一個(gè)外交大臣得以實(shí)行，那么他們成功的機(jī)會(huì)當(dāng)然會(huì)增加。
    如果我假裝說我和首相之間的分歧只是一個(gè)孤立的問題，那么我就沒有向下院說實(shí)話。這不是一個(gè)孤立的問題。就在過去的幾個(gè)星期中，我們?cè)谝豁?xiàng)極為重要的外交決策方面的分歧是根本性的分歧，這項(xiàng)決策與意大利毫不相干。而且近來我已越來越清楚，我想他也一樣：我們之間在觀點(diǎn)和方法上都存在著真正的分歧。
    近來，我日益堅(jiān)信，與其說別人應(yīng)和我方達(dá)成協(xié)議，不如說我方過分熱衷于要和別人達(dá)成協(xié)議。我國(guó)以前從未采取過這種態(tài)度。從和平的利益來看，這也不是我們今天應(yīng)有的態(tài)度。
    如果我們讓這樣的印象在國(guó)外流傳：我們已屈服于持續(xù)的壓力，那么，我不相信我們能夠在歐洲緩和問題上取得進(jìn)展，特別是從最近幾天所發(fā)生的事件來看，我就更不相信了。
    我確信，能否取得進(jìn)展首先取決于民族的勇氣，而這種勇氣必須表現(xiàn)在一種堅(jiān)定的精神之中。我相信這種精神是存在的。我認(rèn)為，不指出這一點(diǎn)，無論對(duì)我國(guó)還是對(duì)全世界都是不公平的。